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ABSTRACT
Historically, sea mines warfare have played an important role in warfare,
which a naval officer cannot afford to neglect. During the recent mine
campaign in the Middle East involving Iran and Iraq, commanders delayed
decisions on whether or not to deploy mine countermeasure (MCM) forces.
As a result, damage occurred to ships in a minefield that could have been
prevented by the speedy application of MCM. Before an operational mission
is commenced, there are several uncertain questions in the mind of the
commander: Do the mine-fields exist? Which country laid the mines? What
type of delivery platform laid the mines? Where are the mines? What kind of
mines are they? Do we need to deploy the MCM forces? Previously, these
kinds of fuzzy questions were very difficult to answer by a tactical principle.
In this thesis, the probabilistic inference network in an expert system
environment is used to answer the above questions. The probabilistic
inference network method is supported by the certainty factors. Calculations
involving quantitative probabilities for answers to the above questions could
enable the MCM experts to offer suggestions to the commander for reducing
the ship's vulnerability at sea during wartime.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this thesis is to design a probabilistic inference network as an
expert system for use in mine warfare. This inference network can be used to
offer suggestions to the commander for reducing the ship's vulnerability at
sea. This chapter discusses the problems of mine warfare and the objectives
of the thesis.
A. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT
Mines are increasingly becoming a weapon of choice. They are a
powerful political, as well as, military option. Stress and uncertainty lie at the
heart of mine warfare. Minefields are similar to the twilight zone-they
work more on human minds than on the ships themselves. As we can see
from the mine chronology [Ref. l:p. 291-2951, mine warfare has been a part
of history since the beginning of 600 B.C. There are many questions faced by
the commanders involving the prediction of events: Will there be a
minefield? Which country will be involved? What delivery platform will
lay the mines? Where will be the minefields? What kind of mines will there
be? Dependent on the answer to these questions the commander will
consider the deployment of mine countermeasure (MCM) forces. The specific
reasons for any decision are often obscure, and the decision to avoid a
minefield or to risk it is influenced by many factors; one of them is the
decision maker's perception of the minefield.
In many practical problem-solving situations, the available knowledge is
incomplete or inexact. Weather prediction and medical diagnosis are two
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examples. In cases such as these, our knowledge is not adequate enough to
use precise logic inference. However, people have ways of drawing inferences
from incomplete, inexact, or uncertain knowledge and information.
Although our knowledge is not complete, we can and do make
generalizations and approximations that help us summarize our experiences
and predict the outcome of events. Generalizations are often subject to error,
and yet we still use them because they provide a useful probabilistic tool.
The knowledge in a machine is also limited. Intelligent machines often
work with incomplete information in the form of quantitative
approximations. Probabilistic reasoning methods allow fuzzy logic (FL) to use
uncertain or probabilistic knowledge to derive a confident decision. In
addition, probabilistic methods can help us accumulate evidence for
hypotheses in a fair way; they are appropriate tools in making "just"
decisions. Decision theory, related to the theory of probability, provides
additional techniques that help to minimize risk in making decisions.
Therefore, it is appropriate to use the probabilistic reasoning methods in
expert systems to solve the decision problems involved in mine warfare. The
decision factors are represented by levels in the probabilistic inference
networks. Calculations involving quantitative probabilities for answers to
the questions in building an inference network could offer suggestions to the
commander for reducing the ship's vulnerability at sea during wartime.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The Naval mine is defined as follows [Ref. 2:p. 2-1]:
A mine is an explosive device laid in the water with the intention
of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring shipping from
entering an area. The term does not include devices attached to the
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bottoms of ships or to harbor installations by personnel operating
underwater, nor does it include devices that explode immediately
on expiration of a predetermined time after laying.
They are two main purposes that may be served by mine warfare:
- To damage or destroy enemy shipping.
- To deny the enemy use of certain waters, or at least hinder his
operations in these waters by the threat presented by a minefield.
For a minefield to accomplish the first purpose, it must be laid in secret in
a busy shipping lane. Secrecy is essential, for if the enemy suspects a
minefield is present, he can sweep to eliminate the mines or perhaps simply
reroute shipping around the field. The requirement that the field be laid in
secret usually restricts the number of mines that can be used. Therefore, a
large number of ships must pass through the field before the probability of a
hit becomes great enough to be significant.
Minefields laid to accomplish the second purpose should be highly
advertised after planting in order to deter enemy shipping. Knowing of the
presence of the mines, the enemy will attempt to render the field harmless by
sweeping operations. Consequently, some effort must be devoted to keeping
the field active. This means that the field must be reseeded at a rate
equivalent to the sweeping rate of the enemy.
Mine warfare is complex, obscure, and controversial. Yet it is an
important adjunct of the capacity of countries to wage war. Mines have been
used in wars for many centuries and history shows that mine warfare is a
constant struggle between the mine designer and MCM. Mine warfare is
therefore a battle of wits between the mine user and his enemy's
countermeasures. In this thesis, concentration is on the MCM, within a
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specific operational mission, to clear up mines that were laid by the defensive
country in the approaching sea area. It is very difficult, without sufficient
information about minefields, for the commander of mine warfare to make
a decision whether to deploy MCM forces. Therefore, we seek to model
general decision-making in a computationally practical, yet mathematically
meaningful way. Here the "probabilistic inference network" structures are
presented as formal structures for representing decision-making systems.
This model can offer an overall picture to the commander of mine warfare
the following possibilities:
- the existence of minefield;
- the country that laid the mines;
- the mine delivery platform;
- the mine location;
- the kind of mines laid in the minefield; and
- decisions concerning MCM deployment.
The outcomes of the specific event possibilities were determined by
calculations which will be described in Chapter IV. The probabilistic
inference network can handle information processing tasks with the
following advantages:
- pieces of information are available at various levels of certainty and
completeness;
- there is a need for optimal or nearly optimal decisions;
- there may be a need to justify the arguments in favor of the leading
alternative choices; and
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- general rules of inference (either based on scientific theory, or simply
heuristic) are known or can be found for the problem.
Usually there must also be an economic need for the application of these
techniques to a problem domain. Accurate models for complex phenomena
take a significant effort to develop, even with the help of experts.
Listed below are some examples of actual or potential areas of practical
application of inference networks:
- medical diagnosis;
- fault diagnosis in machines and computer software (including
automobiles, airplanes, computers, spacecraft, etc.);
- mineral prospecting;
- criminal investigations;
- military strategy formulation (including war-time decision-making);
- marketing strategy and investment; and
- decision-making in design processes (e.g., software design, suspension
bridge design, VLSI circuit design).
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Chapter II introduces mine warfare, expert systems, and fuzzy logic.
Chapter M discusses the design process of the probabilistic inference network.
Chapter IV presents the results of the simulation of mine warfare inference
network that can be supported by the certainty factors. Chapter V concludes
the thesis work and recommends future efforts.
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II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
In Chapter I, mine warfare was dipicted as a constant struggle between the
mine designer and MCM. The problem is that without sufficient information
about the minefield, clean up is difficult. In order to find a proper method to
help the commander make a decision from the incomplete, inexact, or
uncertain knowledge and information, fuzzy logic (FL) systems use uncertain
or probabilistic knowledge to account for real uncertainties. In this thesis, FL
is incorporated with an expert system application.
This chapter introduces the required background of this thesis for
designing the probabilistic inference networks. They are mine warfare, expert
systems, and FL.
A. MINE WARFARE
Mine warfare has been divided into four parts: types of mines, MCM, the
mine delivery, and the minefield planning.
1. Types of Mines
Mines can be divided into two main categories: [Ref. 2:p. 2-2]
aL The Controlled Mine
A mine which after laying can be controlled by the user. The
degree of control is generally the ability to make safe or live or to fire the
mine at a particular moment.
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b. The Independent Mine
A mine which is not controlled. They are operated automatically
by some device activated by the presence of ship.
An independent mine can be:
(1) A Contact Mine. A mine which is fired by physical contact
with the target.
(2) An Induced Mine. A mine actuated by the effect of a ship
on some physical condition in the vicinity of the mine or on radiations
emanating from the mine. There are three basic types of the induced mines:
- The magnetic mine. This mine is actuated by the passage
of a metal-hulled ship which causes a disturbance of the vertical component
of the earth's magnetic field.
- The acoustic mine. The acoustic exploder mechanism is
equipped with hydrophones to detect the noise made by the ship's machinery.
- The pressure mine reacts to the phenomenon that a ship
in shallow water creates two pressure waves on the sea bottom, separated by a
low-pressure (null) area.
Mines can also be constructed with a combination of two or
more of the basic influence mechanisms. These types are given a name, The
Combination Mine ; each influence criterion must be satisfied for mine
detonation to be possible.
(3) A Moored Mine. A mine of positive buoyancy held below
the surface by a mooring attached to a sinker on the bottom.
(4) A Ground Mine. A mine with negative buoyance which
remains on the sea-bed.
7
(5) A Drifting Mine. A buoyant or neutrally-buoyant mine,
free to move under the influence of wind or tide. It may be attached to a small
baulk of timber or other innocent-looking object.
(6) An Oscillating Mine. A drifting mine which maintains its
depth by means of a hydrostatic depth control mechanism which causes it to
oscillate about a set depth.
(7) A Creeping Mine. A buoyant mine held below the surface
by a weight, usually in the form of a chain, which is free to creep along the
sea-bed under influence of stream or current.
(8) A Mobile Mine. A mine with propulsion equipment like a
torpedo, which sinks at the end of its run to become a ground mine.
(9) A Homing Mine. A mine with propulsion equipment
which homes on to a target. The mine normally lies on the sea-bed or is
secured to a sinker, and is set in motion by a ship influence.
(10) A Rising Mine. A mine having positive buoyancy which is
released from a sinker by a ship influence. The mine may fire by contact,
hydrostatic pressure or other means.
(11) A Bouquet Mine. A mine where a number of buoyant
mine cases are attached to the same sinker. When the mooring of one mine
case is cut by a sweep, another mine case rises from the sinker to its set depth.
Chapter IV considers only the contact mine and the induced
mine as the nodes in the probabilistic inference network for mine warfare.
2. Mine CounterMeasures
This subsection introduces the aim of MCM and the types of MCM.
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a. The Aim of MCM
The aim of MCMs is to permit warships and merchant vessels to
keep to the seas and enter and leave ports, as necessary for the furtherance of
the war effort and support of the population, without unacceptable damage or
losses from enemy mines. [Ref. 2:p. 1-1]
This aim can be achieved by:
- Preventing the enemy from laying mines.
- Forcing or enticing the enemy to lay his mines in waters which
our ships do not need or do not use.
- Causing mines to explode without loss, or with acceptable loss,
to shipping by the use of MCM forces.
- Causing the mines to become ineffective by removing them to
a safe place or by preventing the firing mechanism from operating.
- Reducing the danger to shipping by confining ships to routes
in which enemy mines are scarce or non-existent, either because mines have
not been laid there in any quantity or because their number has been reduced
by the actions of MCM forces.
- Altering the characteristics of ships, either permanently or
temporarily, so that they do not, or are less liable to, actuate mines.
b. Types of MCM
MCMs are of three general types:
- Special equipment installed on board ship to prevent the
mine's actuating devices from functioning.
- Physically removing, exploding or disarming mines in a
minefield before friendly ships transit the field.
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- Circumnavigation of the field.
The last requires little comment, because it is obvious that if a
minefield's exact location is known, shipping can be routed around it without
undue inconvenience.
When it is necessary to use waters known or suspected to be
mined, then sweeping or hunting operations are required to clear a channel
through which shipping can pass. In shallow, clear waters moored mine may
be visible from a boat or a helicopter. Hunting operations consist of locating
individual mines and then disarming or destroying them.
(1) Disarming or Removing. Disarming or removing mines is
especially hazardous when the same areas are subject to bombing by the
enemy, as in the case of Vietnam anchorages and mud flats. Compounding
the difficulty is the fact that mines are mostly buried, and require different
handling.
Sweeping operations vary with the type of mine. For
moored mines, a cable with a paravane device to support the cable at its outer
end and to hold it out at an angle to the sweeper is towed through the water.
Spaced along the cable are cutting blades which sever the mooring lines of
mines encountered. The mines then bob to the surface and can be destroyed
by gunfire.
Bottom mines are obviously not vulnerable to this type of
sweeping activity. Certain types of influence mines may be destroyed,
however, by towing a device to simulate the influence field of a ship and
thereby cause the mines to explode. Noise-makers may be used to actuate
acoustic mines. A device to create an electromagnetic field sufficient to
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disturb the vertical component of the earth's magnetic field may be used to
actuate magnetic mines. The device can be towed by either ship or helicopter.
The most difficult mine to counter is the pressure mine.
The difficulty lies in attempting to create the pressure disturbance of a large
moving ship without using a large moving ship. Such sweeping devices are
very expensive. It may be worthwhile to note, however, that one mine
defense tactic which could be employed is to move ships through a suspected
minefield in column so that all but the lead ship would in effect be traversing
waters already swept.
(2) Minesweeping. Minesweeping is a slow, expensive and
nerve-racking business. It is successful only to some degree. The word
sterilized is frequently used to describe a minefield presumably rendered
harmless by minesweeping or hunting operations. However, one can never
be 100 percent certain that all mines have been destroyed. It is only possible to
reduce the probability of ships' being destroyed by mines to a level that is
acceptable to the commander responsible for ordering forces into mined
waters. Delayed arming devices make it possible for sweeping ships to pass
through an area without detecting any mines. Yet, some time after the
sweeping ships have passed through, the mines can be become active.
(3) Minehunting. Minehunting is the location of individual
mines by ship and/or airborne equipment and/or divers, and their
subsequent disposal. As the range of detection and speed of the ship are
limited for physical reasons, the time taken for a hunting operation may be
minimized by effective mine-watching and accurate navigation. A hunting
operation in good bottom conditions is not necessarily longer than a
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sweeping operation, especially if mines of high ship counts are used. The
surest means of classification and destruction is by examination and
countermining by divers. Neutralization of the mine firing mechanism
leaving the mine case virtually intact may however be achieved by the
dropping of explosive charges close to the mine by surface vessel or
helicopter, but an accumulation of "dead" mine cases on the bottom will
increase the difficulties of minehunting. This increase will not be so
important if the positions of the mine cases can be accurately recorded by
precise navigation methods, or marked (as by triplanes) so as to be readily
recognizable.
(4) Clearance Diving. Clearance diving forms a part of the
minehunting team. These are divers specially trained in underwater
location, identification and disposal of mines. They may be used alone, for
example in docks and basins, or in conjunction with the operations of
minehunting vessels. Tidal currents, poor visibility and lack of mobility
render clearance diving operations very slow, but certain areas where
minesweeping and minehunting operations using ships are impractical can
only be cleared by clearance divers.
(5) Passive Measures. Passive measures on board a ship vary
with the type of mine against which the ship is defending. As a defense
against magnetic mines, degaussing coils are used to counter the disturbance
which a metal ship would otherwise cause in the earth's magnetic field.
Some limited defense against acoustic and pressure disturbance is possible.
The defence against moored contact mines is to detect the mines by sonar,
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helicopter or other visual means, and then maneuver the ship to avoid
them.
3. The Mine Delivery
Tactically, we implement the minelayer aspect of the mine warfare.
The mine delivery platform's purpose is to carry and lay mines into the
minefield. According to their different function, they are surface delivery,
submarine delivery, and aircraft delivery.
a. Surface Delivery
Surface delivery is most useful when it is essential to accurately
position mines in a minefield and when the enemy forces in the area are
weak or nonexistent. In fact, the ship is a typical model of the surface
minelayer. The ships have been designed and built to provide storage,
servicing and minelaying facilities; nevertheless, the ship is vulnerable to
attack by shore batteries, surface, air, or subsurface units.
b. Submarine Delivery
The Germans were the first to utilize the submarine to lay mines
covertly under the very noses of their enemy. With mines designed so that
they can be launched through the standard torpedo tubes, any attack-type
submarine is a potential minelayer. Submarine minelaying is a means of
obtaining very accurate positioning with greatly reduced probability that the
delivery vehicle will be detected. It would be a mistake, however, to leave the
impression that submarines are immune to detection in hostile areas.
Submarines are most vulnerable to detection and attack when operating in
waters shallow enough to be mineable.
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c. Aircraft Delivery
Minelaying by aircraft is especially useful in waters controlled by
the enemy, even where formidable enemy defenses exist. Aircraft are most
useful for replenishment of an already active minefield. Mines may be
dropped from most bombers, or even transport aircraft, with very slight
changes to existing configurations. The U.S. Air Force B-29 was used
effectively for this purpose during World War II. Air-dropped mines are
often rigged with parachutes to slow their descent and reduce the impact
velocity. The position accuracy of air-drop minefields is generally excellent if
they are laid by aircraft with accurate air navigation and computer delivery
systems. Some mines may be ineffective because of damage during the drop.
In summary, it is readily apparent that one advantage of mine
warfare is that no specially designed vehicles are required for delivery. Any
nation with ships, bombers or submarines has a potential minelaying force.
4. Minefield Planning
Obviously, a preliminary consideration in planning a minefield is
the mineability of the waters. There are two factors to consider:
- Where the objective is destruction of shipping, it is essential that
the plan not be detected by the enemy.
- Where the objective is to deny the enemy use of certain waters, the
commander must decide whether the objective justifies the risk to the
minelaying force.
Besides the preliminary consideration of mineability, the
effectiveness of a minefield is a function of certain other factors:
- Density of enemy shipping traffic.
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- Density of mines in the field, which in turn is a function of the
number of mines and the area of the minefield.
- Effective area of influence of the mines used.
- The effective influence area of a transiting ship, which is a function
of the length of path through the field and the width of the ship's influence
area.
Consider the minefield for which the objective is destruction of
enemy shipping. One might hope that several ships would blunder into the
field before it is identified by the enemy and shipping warned away.
However, realistically one can only count on the first mine which is
detonated. Thereafter, enemy countermeasures will attempt to render the
field useless. Hence, a measurement of effectiveness for such a field is the
probability that one ship will be sunk.
Generally, this minefield model is based on the following
assumptions:
- Mines have been laid in secrecy and the enemy is unaware of the
field's existence.
- Ships traverse the field on one of two known headings, these being
parallel but opposite.
- Ships considered as traffic must pass within the outer limits of the
field but are equally likely to enter the field at any point between the limits.
- A ship which enters the mine's influence area will detonate the
mine with certainty.
- A mine which is detonated will sink the ship with certainty.
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In summary, the best of the MCM is to minimize the existence of the
probability that any ships will be sunk. This thesis deals with getting rid of
the mines and maintaining our shipping route. After the simulation have
been done in Chapter IV, the MCM expert will be highly confident to clean up
the minefield before friendly ships hit any mines. Therefore, the minefield
planning will be divided into three parts, which are the shipping traffic lane,
coast, and the nearest point land.
B. EXPERT SYSTEMS
Expert systems technology is widely perceived as Al technology with the
most potential for the development of applications that require domain
experts' knowledge. Expert systems are computer programs that are equipped
with expert knowledge to help users solve problems. For example, an expert
system called MYCIN provides expert advice to medical doctors on the
diagnosis and treatment of various types of bacterial information [Ref. 31.
MYCIN is considered an "expert" system because its procedures for
diagnosing and recommending treatment are modeled after judgmental
heuristics employed by human experts. Emulating human expert behavior is
often considered an essential characteristic of an expert system. Expert system
technology provides a powerful set of tools for developing systems that can
generate expert advice to users for solving important and complex problems.
The success of an expert system depends: domain selection, selection of
expert(s), knowledge acquisition, and problem development. A basic
introduction to expert system technology is provided in the following.
Virtually all expert systems contain two basic components: a knowledge base
and an inference engine, and a user interface.
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1. Knowledge Base and Inference Engine
In a knowledge base, domain-specific knowledge is expressed as a set
of condition-action pairs referred to as production rules that specify the action
to be carried out, if the prerequisite conditions are satisfied. The typical
structure of a condition-action system is shown in Figure 2-1.
control scheme
condition action





Figure 2-1 The Structure of a Condition-Action System
Expert systems can be described as computer-consultants that
emulate human expert reasoning in a problem domain. The process of
extracting and encoding domain knowledge held by human expertise is called
knowledge engineering. Today, knowledge engineering remains a time-
consuming and labor-intensive process wherein a knowledge engineer, must
repeatedly interview one or more human experts over a long time period to
extract the heuristics to be encoded in the expert system knowledge base. The
role of the inference er.gine is to control the order of rule activation and to
update the belief value of the hypotheses based upon acquired evidence.
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2. User Interface
A user interface caters to a smooth communication between the user
and the system. It may also provide the user with insight into the problem-
solving process carried out by the inference engine.
It is convenient to view the inference engine and the interface as one
module, usually called an expert system shell, or shell. Figure 2-2 illustrates
the basic expert system architecture.
The advantages of separating the knowledge base from the inference
engine are listed below: [Ref 4]
Knowledge can be represented in a uniform fashion (i.e., If... then...
style).
* The same inference engine and user interface can be applied to
different problem domains (one only needs to add new knowledge).
* It allows modifications of one part without creating side effects in
other parts of the code.
* System builders can focus directly on capturing and organizing
problem-solving knowledge rather than on the details of low level
implementations.









Figure 2-2 A Simplified View of Expert System Architecture
Most expert systems deal with various classes of inference problems,
where the expert system must draw conclusions from various evidence or
data inputs. In these types of inference problems, the set of rules (see Figure
2-3) can be graphically represented in the form of a set of inference networks.
As illustrated in Figure 2-4, an inference network contains top-level
hypotheses that are decomposed into various levels of subhypotheses. The
subhypotheses, in turn, are further broken down into specific items of
evidence, called nodes, that can support these hypotheses. With each node,
there is usually an associated prior probability and a rule for combining a
subnode prior probability into an updated probability for the node. We will
give a detailed description in Chapter I of the interrelationship between
node (evidence) and subnode (hypothesis).
19
IF: The exhaust is smoky, and
The car is backfiring, and
There is a lack of power,
THEN: The carburetor fuel mix is too rich.
F: There is a lack of power, and
There is a gray deposit on the spark plugs, and
The engine overheats,
THEN: The carburetor fuel mix is too weak.
IF: The carburetor fuel mix is too rich, or
The carburetor fuel mix is too weak,
THEN: The carburetor fuel mix needs to be adjusted.






RICH MIX WEAK MIX
The caburetor The carburetor
fuel mix is too fuel mix is too
nich weak
SMOKY BACK- LACK OF GRAY- OVER-
FIRING POWER PLUGS HEATS
The exhaust The car is There is a There is a gray The engine
is smoky backfiring lack of deposit on the overheats
power spak plugs
Figure 2-4 Sample Inference Network
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C. USP
In this thesis, we use a C program (Appendix A) to create a knowledge
base that is used by the inference network. The inference network is written
in LISP.
Commonly used Al languages are LISP and Prolog. The programming
language LISP is first implemented at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) in the late 1950s under the derection of J. McCarthy [Ref.
51. LISP is designed specifically for list processing, the manipulation of
symbolic information, although it has a capability for numerical data
handling as well. LISP uses lambda calculus as a formal, applicative structure
with interesting theoretical properties. LISP is especially good for applications
in AI and is the most widely used language for this purpose.
LISP gives the programmer great power and flexibility. Data
structures are created dynamically without the need for the programmer to
explicitly allocate memory. This thesis uses a C program to create a LISP data
segment to be used by the inference network code. Declarations for data are
not necessary, and a LISP symbol, acting as a variable, may represent one kind
of object (e.g., an integer) at one time and a completely different kind of object
(e.g., a binary tree) a little later. Using one basic data-structuring concept, the
"S-expression," both programs and data are easily represented.
D. FUZZY LOGIC
Logic, according to Webster's Dictionary, is the science of the normative
formal principles of reasoning. In this sense, fuzzy logic (FL) is concerned
with the formal principles of approximate reasoning, with precise reasoning
viewed as a limiting case. In more specific terms, what is central about FL is
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that, unlike classical logical systems, it aims at modeling the imprecise modes
of reasoning that play an essential role in the remarkable human ability to
make rational decisions in an environment of uncertainty and imprecision.
This ability depends, in turn, on the ability to infer an approximate answer to
a question based on a store of knowledge that is inexact, incomplete, or not
totally reliable.
Fuzzy Logic enables computers to simulate the ambiguities encountered
in real-life situations. The basic idea underlying FL control was suggested in
notes published in 1968 [Ref. 6] and 1972 [Ref. 7] and described in greater
detail in 1973 [Ref. 8:p. 28-44]. The first implementation was pioneered by
Mamdani and Assilian in 1974 [Ref. 9] in connection with the regulation of a
steam engine. During the past several years, FL has found numerous
applications in fields ranging from elevator control to stock trading. Table 2-1
[Ref. 10:p. 42-44] lists some common products utilizing FL. Amazingly its
most important and visible application today is in a realm not anticipated
when FL was conceived, namely, the realm of process control [Ref. 1l:p. 83-
89]. Chapter m gives a detailed explanation of how to use "fuzzy inference
rules" to obtain the current probability for each node.
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TABLE 2-1 PRODUCTS UTILIZING FUZZY LOGIC
Product Company Role of Fuzzy Logic
Evaluates passenger traffic
Elevator Control Fujitec / Toshiba to reduce waiting time and
enhance car announcement
accuracy
Selects best golf club for an
Golf diagnostic system Maruman Golf individual's physique and
swing
Determines best focus and
Video camcorder Sanyo Fisher / Canon lighting when several objects
are in picture
Senses quality and quantity of
Washing machine Matsushita dirt, load size, and fabric
type, and adjusts wash cycle
Senses floor condition and
Vacuum cleaner Matsushita dust quantity and adjusts
vacuum cleaner motor power
Adjusts heating element to
Hot water heater Matsushita correspond to temperature and
amount of water being used
Determines optimum constant




Television Sony color, and contrast
Interprets handwritten input
Handheld computer Sony for data entry
Senses driving style and
Auto transmission Subaru engine load to select best gear
ratio
Stock trading program Yamaichi Securities Manages stock protfolios
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III. MATHEMATICAL METHOD
In many practical problem-solving situations the available information is
incomplete or inexact. The knowledge is inadequate to support the desired
logical inference. However, we can apply generalizations and approximations
for transforming our experience into a prediction. This thesis applies
Tanimoto's probabilistic inference network [Ref. 51 that allows the expert
systems to use uncertain or probabilistic knowledge. We also apply the
concept of the FL to solve the inconsistency problem in the inference
networks.
This chapter discusses Bayes' rule, probabilistic inference networks,
updating probability in inference networks, and certainty factors. Use of these
techniques to construct the model for mine warfare is done in Chapter IV.
A. BAYES' RULE
This thesis assumes that the commander wants to know the probabilities
that candidate countries have laid mines, given evidence of the existence of a
minefield. The following general knowledge may be available: (a) the
probability that country-2 has laid mines, regardless of any evidence, (b) the
probability that the minefield exists, given that country-2 has laid mines, and
(c) the probability that the minefield exists, given that country-2 has not laid
mines. In addition, the information of the existent minefield is available. Let
H be the hypothesis and E be the evidence listed below:
- H = "Country-2 has laid mines," and
- E = "A minefield has been found."
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Thus we have general information:
1. P(H): probability that country-2 has laid mines,
2. P(E I H): probability that the minefield is discovered, given that
country-2 has laid mines, and
3. P(E I -H): Probability that the minefield is discovered, given that
country-2 has not laid mines; assuming a minefield exists.
We want the value of P(H I E) which represents the probability that country-2
has laid mines, given that minefield is discovered. The P(H I E) value can be
computed by Bayes' rule:
P(I E) P(E I H)P(H)
P(E)
where
P(E) = P(E I H)P(H) + P(E I -H)P(-H).
To continue the case, we assume the general knowledge of the
following values:
P(H) = 0.01 P(E I H) = 0.85 P(E I-H) = 0.001.
From the formula described above, we can compute
P(E) = (0.85)(0.01) + (0.001)(1 - 0.01)
which is approximately 0.0095 and
P(H I E) = (0.85)(0.01) / 0.0095 = 0.8957.
Thus, the probability that country-2 has laid mines, given that the
minefield is discovered, is about 0.9. On the other hand, if the minefield is
not discovered, the probability that country-2 has laid mines would be
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P(-E I H)P(H) (1 - 0.85)(0.01)
P(-E) (1- 0.0095)
= 0.1581.
B. PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE NETWORKS
1. Appropriate Domains
Making a decision means choosing among alternative courses of
action with or without all the relevant information and often with uncertain
information as well. The need for intelligent decision-making is omnipresent
in intelligent beings. In people, the need arises at the simple level of choosing
whether or not to step around a puddle on a rainy day, or at the complicated
level of choosing a treatment plan for a medical patient. Animals need such
abilities to find food and evade predators. A mathematician may need to
choose from a set of possible directions in which to search for a proof [Ref. 51.
2. Heuristical Elements of Inference Networks
Because of the incomplete knowledge of the conditional probability
distribution for the various possible states of evidence, the successful
inference network cannot usually be developed directly from Bayes' rule. A
reasonable alternative is to develop a hierarchy of "fuzzy" assertions or
hypotheses and use substantiated hypotheses at level 1 to infer hypotheses at
level 1+1 (see Figure 3-1 and 3-2). Bayes' rule can be used directly to
substantiate (establish probability values for) level-I hypotheses from the
observed evidence. Then "fuzzy inference rules" are used to obtain
probabilities for other hypotheses, given the evidence.
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3. Fuzzy Inference Rules
Fuzzy inference rules are functions for propagating probability
values. The general form of such a function is:
f [0,1]n-> [0,1].
Thus, a fuzzy inference rule takes an n -tuple of probabilities as
arguments and returns a single probability. The truth table and two sets of









Figure 3-1 Bayes' Rule Application
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intermediate states
evidences hypotheses of nature
I 0
update first level
hypotheses with update subsequent
Bayes' rule levels using
fuzzy inference
Figure 3-2 Heuristic Inference System
TABLE 3-1 INFERENCE RULES AND TWO FUZZY LOGICS
A B -A AA B AVB A->B A@ B
F F T F F T F
F T T F T T T
T F F F T F T
T T F T T T F
I b I-a min(e,b I max(a,b) mx(1-a,b) xor(a,b)
In Table 3-1, the possibilistic logic rule for A @ B is xor(a,b) =
max(min(a,1-b),min(1-a,b)). We use the possibilistic logic or the fuzzy logic
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in the thesis. Note that the value for A A B in the possibilistic logic is not
larger than either the values for A and B.
4. Design of Inference Networks
We assume that relationships and probabilities needed to construct
an inference network are provided by an expert, in collaboration either with
an AI programmer or with an interactive tool for building expert systems. To
design an inference network, the following basic steps are required [Ref. 5]:
- determination of the relevant inputs (i.e., set of possible evidence),
- determination of states of nature or decision alternatives,
- determination of intermediate assertions that may be useful in the
inference network,
- formulation of inference links, and
- tuning the probabilities and/or the fuzzy inference functions.
Each of these steps will be explained in sequence. The relevant
inputs are usually properties of the object under study. For mine warfare, the
relevant input is the likelihood of the existence of a minefield. For the case
studied in Chapter IV, if country-1 is known to use submarines to lay mines,
then the other mine delivery platforms, the ships or aircraft, may be declared
relevant through correlation with the country-1. Relevance determination is
non-trivial and requires experts' knowledge. The states of nature are learned
from experience or through training. In our case, it is a decision of whether
or not to deploy the MCM force.
The intermediate assertions are used to infer the probabilistic
network from the relevant inputs to yield the states of nature. Attributes (of
the object or situation under investigation) which are not directly observable
29
but probabilistically related to the inputs and states of nature form the basis of
intermediate assertions. The nodes for each intermediate assertion or level of
mine warfare have been discussed in section A. The intermediate assertions
include the country involved in laying mines, the delivery platform used to
lay the mines, the location of the mines, and types of mines.
Formulation of inference links may be done on the basis of
correlations among attributes. First, a search is made for the simplest logical
relationships, and then more and more complicated ones are sought. In order
of increasing complexity of relationships we have [Ref. 5]:
- logical concurrence-e.g., an input highly correlated with partial
state of nature;
- negative concurrence-strong negative correlation;
- logical implication-whenever A occurs, B does too;
- conjunction-C occurs whenever both A and B occur;
- disjunction-C occurs whenever either A or B occur; and
- exclusive disjunction-either A or B occurs but not both.
Whenever the node(s) for the state of nature has been connected (possibly via
intermediate nodes) to the inputs, the inference network topology has been
constructed. Probability updating functions still need to be chosen to
propagate the effects of inputs throughout the network.
If Bayes' rule is to be used to compute the first-level inference in the
network, then there is no need for fuzzy inference rules at that level. But FL
updating functions (which are defined later) may be used at subsequent levels
to represent the ways information is to propagate through these levels.
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Probability values associated with various parts of the network need to be
tuned to give reasonable performance. Prior probabilities for states of nature
and intermediate assertions must be specified. The conditional probabilities
are also essential for Bayesian updating, and they must be well-chosen to give
reasonable results. Statistical learning methods might be employed to obtain
and to improve probability estimates.
C. UPDATING IN INFERENCE NETWORKS
In an inference network the general format of an inference rule is the
following: the statement P(H I E) is interpreted "if E, then H," where E is the
evidence and H is the hypothesis. In some cases, the evidence may be
compounded and instead of E we have El, E2, ... , En where Ei is the ith piece of
evidence bearing on the hypothesis. Each inference rule has a certain
strength associated with it, which is the power of the evidence in that rule to
confirm the hypothesis in that rule. We now discuss the means for updating
probabilities associated with hypotheses on the basis of the certainty with
which we know the evidence to be present. The "subjective-Bayesian"
updating rules have proved to be useful in expert systems such as
PROSPECTOR [Ref. 12:p. 153-167] and will be used in this thesis. We begin by
formulating the "odds likelihood" version of Bayes' rule.
1. Odds Likelihood and Bayes' Rule
Bayes' rule is usually formulated as follows:
P(E I H)P(H)P(I- I E) = PEIFPP(E)
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Dividing these two equations, we obtain the odds likelihood for Bayes' rule
[Ref. 51. An event X having probability P(X) has odds O(X) as:
P(X)O(X) = I - P(X)"
When O(X) is given we can compute P(X) as:
0(X)P(X)1 + O(X)"
We may now express the odd, likelihood formulation for Bayes'
rule:
O(HIE) = XO(H).
Here O(H) is prior odds on H and A. is defined to be the likelihood ratio : =
P(E I H)/P(E I -H). Thus, we can update the odds on H given the evidence E by
the product of the prior odds on H and the likelihood ratio X.
Apparently, in the construction of an inference network, an expert
should provide a value of X for each rule. In our mine warfare case, an expert
should provide P(E I H) and P(E I -H) for calculating X and ' (where ' will
soon be defined.) A C program (see Appendix A) may generate a data
segment for the LISP program and calculate X and ' on each arc in the
inference network. If X is much greater than 1, the rule has a high strength
indicating that the presence of the evidence E makes it much more probable
that H is true, that is, P(E I H) > P(E I -H). In such a case, we may speak of E as
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being "sufficient" for H. Thus, X may refer to as a sufficiency coefficient for
the rule. Otherwise, if X is dose to zero (significantly less than 1), then the
presence of the evidence reduces the likelihood of H, and it would be
reasonable to say that E is sufficient for -H.
Now, suppose E is false or known to be not present (rather than not
known). Then we may write
0(HI--E) = X'O(H)
where X' is defined as
X, P(-EIH) 1- P(EIH)
P(-EI-H) - 1- P(EI-H)
This provides a way to update the odds on H when the information about E is
negative. If 0 < ' << 1, (that is, X' is between 0 and 1 but much closer to 0
than to 1), then we may say that E is "necessary" for H since the absence of the
E (i.e., or the truth of -E) makes H very unlikely. We sometimes speak of X' as
the necessity coefficient for the rule.
Continuing with the mine warfare case, we can compute the
probability that country-2 has laid mines, given that the minefield exists.
Since P(H), the prior probability that country-2 has laid mines, is 0.01, the
odds, O(H), is 0.01/0.99 = 0.0101. Thus, X is P(E I H)/P(E I-H) = 0.85/0.001 = 850
and X' is (1 - P(E I H))/(1 - P(E I-H)) = 0.15/0.999 = 0.1502. If we know that the
minefield exists, then we compute O(H I E) = XO(H) = 850 x 0.0101 = 8.585. On
the other hand, if the minefield does not exist, we compute O(H I -E) = X'O(H)
= 0.1502 x 0.0101 = 0.0015. In a probabilistic inference network, an arc may be
labelled with a pair of values for X and V' to indicate how the presence or
absence of the evidence influences the odds on the hypotheses in Figure 3-3.
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E represents the fact that the minefield exists, and H represents the fact that
country-2 has laid mines.
(3 , = 850,A=.1502 ( 3 )
Figure 3-3 Arc in an Inference Network
2. Uncertain Evidence
To extend the discussion from the previous section, we may assume
that E above is in fact based on some observations E' [Ref. 51. For example, if
we say that we have 80 percent confidence in E given E', then we can re-
express this as P(E I E') = 0.8. To develop some useful techniques for
propagating probabilities, it is helpful to have the following simplifying
assumption: knowledge of E with certainty would allow us to forget about
the observations E' for purposes of inferring the hypothesis H. Figure 3-4
shows that the only influence of E' on H comes through E.
Figure 3-4 Inference with Uncertain Evidence
To determine P(H I E') we can interpolate the two extreme values
(P(H I E) and P(H I E)) using the conditional probability for E given E' as shown
in Figure 3-5. Taking P(E I E') as the value t in the range [0,1], yields:
P(H I E') = t x P(H I E) + (1 - t) x P(H I -E).
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Note that when t = 0, P(H I -E) implies P(H I E') or E' disprove H, and when t =







P(EIE'): current probability of E
Figure 3-5 A Linear Interpolation Function
Considering the mine warfare case, we assume that the minefield
investigation is known to have been reported by an unreliable investigator,
who takes correct readings 80 percent of the time. Here we have P(E I E') = 0.8,
the probability that the minefield exists (E) given that the investigator daims
that the minefield exists (E'). With the linear interpolation equation, we
compute P(H I E'), the probability that country-2 has laid mines given that the
investigator claims that the minefield exists, as P(H I E') = 0.8 x 0.8957 + 0.2 x
0.1581 = 0.7481. This probability happens to be about 20 percent lower than
(0.8957, see page 25) that for the case in which the investigator is known to be
reliable. The choice of a linear function, rather than some curve, is an
arbitrary one. A linear function simplifies the updating computations.
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3. The Dilemma for Inference Networks
In order to apply Bayes' rule in an inference network, it is necessary
for the various prior probabilities in the network to be consistent with one
another [Ref. 5]. In the absence of any observations E', if we use the prior
probability to compute or 'update' the P(H) we should get the same P(H) given
by the expert. However, an expert often gives subjective prior probabilities to
various part of an inference network that are not consistent.
We explain a method that allows for the inconsistency. The
inconsistency that can arise from the minefield investigator report is
illustrated in Figure 3-6. P(H) should correspond to P(E) along the
interpolation line. The consistent prior probability of E or Pc(E) that
corresponds to P(H) is somewhere to the left or right of the P(E) given by the
expert.
It is important to resolve this inconsistency because various forms of
irregular conduct need to be avoided. Developers of the inference network
systems used in PROSPECTOR [Ref. 12:p. 153-167] and MYCIN [Ref. 31
solved this type of inconsistency by changing the probability update function
P(H I E') from linear to piecewise-linear. This piecewise-linear function is
designed to pass through the points whose coordinates are the prior on E and
the prior on H as given by the experts. For example, Figure 3-7 shows the
piecewise version that solves the inconsistency situation of Figure 3-6.
36
P(HIE'): P(HI-E) _ - -
updated P(H) _ _
probability of H .A )P( I- )| I
I I
0 I I
o P(E) PC (E)
P(EIE'): current probability of E
Figure 3-6 Inconsistency in Prior Probabilities for E and H
4. Updating the Probabilities
The function in Figure 3-7 [Ref. 51 provides a good practical
mathematical method for updating the probability for an inference. The steps
for computing P(H I E') are described as follows.
(1) Compute P(H I E). This step requires O(H) the X values along the
arc from E to H:
o( E) XO(H)
I + O(HE) I + XO(H)
(2) Compute P(H I -E).
P(-E) - O(HI-E) -X'O(H)I + O(HI-E) I + X-O(H)
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(3) Compute P(H I E') from P(E I E') using the function shown in
Figure 3-9:
P(HI-E) + P(EJE')[P(H) - P(I-E)]/P(E)
P(HIE') = if P(EIE') < P(E);H = P(H) + [P(EIE') - P(E)][P(HIE) - P(H)]/[l - P(E)]
otherwise.
1----- -- - --
EP(HIE)_
probability of H
F(H I-E) 0I I
0I I
0 P(E) PC(E) I
P(EjE'): current probability of E
Figure 3-7 Updating the Probability of a Hypothesis
D. CERTAINTY FACTORS
A certainty factor (CF) is a number between -1 and +1 that reflects the
degree of belief in a hypothesis [Ref. 3]. Positive CF's indicate there is
evidence that the hypothesis is valid. When CF=1 the hypothesis is known to
be correct. On the other hand, negative CF's indicate that the evidence
suggests that hypothesis is false. The value of every clinical parameter is
stored by MYCIN along with an associated CF that reflects the system's
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"belief" that the value is correct. In MYCIN, CF can be computed by the two
measures: "Belief" (MB) and "Disbelief" (MD), defined below:
- MB[H,E] = X means "The measure of increased Belief in the hypothesis
H based on the evidence E, is X."
- MD[H,E] = Y means "The measure of increased Disbelief in the
hypothesis H, based on the evidence E, is Y."
Recall the subjective probability theory discussed in section III-A, we may
argue that the expert's probability P(H) reflects his belief in H. Thus, 1-P(H)
can be viewed as an estimate of the expert's disbelief regarding the truth of H.
If P(H I E) is greater than P(H), the observation of E increases the expert's belief
in H while decreasing his disbelief regarding the truth of H. In fact, MB[HE]
is given by the following:
MB[HE] = P(HIE) - P(H)
I - P(H)
On the other hand, if P(H I E) were less than P(H), the observation of E would
decrease the expert's belief in H while increasing his disbelief regarding the
truth of H. MD[H,E] is given by:
MD[HE] = P(H) - P(HIE)
P(H)
Note that one piece of evidence cannot have both favor and disfavor a single
hypothesis. If MB[H,E] > 0 then MD[H,E] = 0. If MD[H,E] > 0 then MB[H,E] = 0.
These definitions may be specified in terms of conditional and a priori
probabilities:
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1 if P(H) = 1,
MB[HE] = max[P(HIE),P(H)] - P(H) otherwise.
max[ 1,01 - P(H)
1 if P(H) = 0,
MD[H,E] = min[P(HIE),P(H)] 
- P(-) otherwise.
min[ 1,0] - P(H)
Note that here P(H) is used to denote a priori probabilities. The CF is defined
in terms of MB and MD as:
CF[H,E] = MB[H,E] - MD[H,E].
In the next chapter, we will explain how the CF value may reenforce our
confidence in the fuzzy inference model. Chapter IV simulates the inference
network also. The network includes the nodes name, prior-probability,
current-probability, and arc expressions. On the other hand, we compute the
CFs from the input probabilities and then we use the CFs to confirm the
current probability for each node in the network. The CF approach may give
the commander an alternate view of the problem.
40
IV. AN INFERENCE NETWORK
Chapter M derived the equation for computing P(H I E') from P(E I E'). To
illustrate this technique for subjective-Bayesian inference in mine warfare,
we consider the problems occasionally faced by the commander in war time.
From Chapter I, the problems that concern the commander in mine
warfare are the following:
- Do the minefields exist?,
- Which country will lay the mines?,
- What delivery platform will lay the mines?,
- Where are the mines?,
- What kind of mines are they?, and
- Do we need to deploy the MCM forces?.
These kinds of problems are fuzzy, and there must accordingly be some
arbitrariness in any method for them. The method presented here is one of
many possibilities; it embodies one of the many possible sets of heuristics for
predicting whether or not to deploy the MCM force on the basis of pre-
mission observations.
This chapter explores the heuristics for mine warfare evaluation, the
implementation of LISP and C programs, the results of the simulation, and
the conclusions of the certainty factors.
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A. HEURISTICS FOR MINE WARFARE EVALUATION
The diagram showing all the nodes and arcs of the probabilistic inference
network for our problem is shown in Figure 4-1. The prior probabilities on
nodes are not shown, but are given in Appendix B and Appendix C, as are the
X and ' values for each arc. Detailed descriptions of these nodes and arcs are
given in the following paragraphs.
INTERMEI)IATE
INPUT VARIBLES 0JT PUT7 ub- \4 ne ares
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countrycontact
civilian- .mine > McM-





Figure 4-1 Probabilistic Inference Network for Mine Warfare Problem
Before actually using a sea area to carry out the operational mission
without consideration of the threat by other enemy's weapons, there is one
important weapon we can not neglect-mines. "Do the minefields exist?", is
becoming the commander's biggest concern. Normally, the belligerents will
know whether or not the minefields exist by means of the announcement of
the minelayer or the report of the mine investigator.
In Figure 4-1, the main variable to be predicted is the deploy-MCM-force
of mine warfare. This comprises such features as contact-mine and induced-
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mine. Since it cannot be known for certain whether the sea area has been
mined, the inferences we make about whether or not to deploy the MCM
force can be probabilistic at best. Since it is difficult to know the statistical
relationships among these variables with any degree of accuracy, the results
cannot even represent true probabilities. All we can say is this: our system
will incorporate the judgment of an imaginary "expert."
Since the input variable, mine-field, can conceivably affect our estimate of
the MCM force deployment, we shall design a network in which the various
tactical concerns are inputs and the final node corresponds to deploy-MCM-
force. To simplify the relationships between input and output to the point
where we can rationally model them, we introduce a number of intermediate
variables as shown in Figure 4-1. The relationships between input and
intermediates, between intermediates and other intermediates, and between
intermediates and output are easier to understand and describe than the
relationship from input directly to output. In our case, the input is the mine-
field, and we introduce a set of three "first intermediate variables" as
intermediates: country-I, country-2, and country-3. These are predicted
directly from the input variable. A set of four "second intermediate
variables" are: warship, civilian-ship, aircraft, and submarine. These are
predicted directly from the first intermediate variables. A set of three "third
intermediate variables" are: nearest-land-point, traffic-lane, and coast. These
are predicted directly from the second intermediate variables. A set of two
"fourth intermediate variables" are: contact-mine and induced-mine. These
are predicted directly from the third intermediate variables. The output is
43
deploy-MCM-force, which finally is predicted directly from the fourth
intermediate variable.
In the following section implements the main program LISP and the
program C, to simulate the variable shown in Figure 4-1. The nodes and
interrelative arcs data are be inputted by the user into the C program.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF LISP AND C PROGRAMS
The most important function in LISP is called UPDATE-PROB shown
below, it uses the formula on page 38 to compute a proper current probability
of H. UPDATE-PROB computes P(H I E') for a single arc.
(defun update-prob (h arc)
(cond
((> (current-prob (car arc))
(prior-prob (car arc)))
(report-progress 'supportive h arc)
(+ (prior-prob h)
(* (/( (prob (* (sufficiency arc)
(prior-odds h)))
(prior-prob h))
(- 1.0 (prior-prob (car arc))))
(- (current-prob (car arc))
(prior-prob (car arc))))))
(t (report-progress 'inhibitive h arc)
(+ (prob (* (necessity arc) (prior-odds h)))
(* (/( (prior-prob h)




In the following functions, we define supporting functions UPDATE-
PROB. They include the function REPORT-PROGRESS, the function ODDS,
and the function PROB.
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The function REPORT-PROGRESS helps to show the progress of
computation through the inference network. This function is outlined
below.




(format t "-%-a probability updating for node -a"
supp-inhib h)
(format t" along arc:-%-s with prior odds -s."
arc (prior-odds h))
(format t "-%Prior and current probs of Evidence are -s and ~s."
(prior-prob (car arc)) (current-prob (car arc)))
The functions ODDS and PROB convert between probability values
(given by an expert in Appendix B) and odds. The function ODDS was
mentioned in Chapter III. Representation of ODDs in LISP is shown below:
(defun odds (prob)
(/ prob (- 1.0 prob)))
The function PROB was also mentioned in Chapter III. Representation of
PROB in LISP is shown below:
(defun prob (odds)
( odds (1+ odds)))
The following function helps create the representation of the network by
entering values onto the property list of the node to get from the execution of
the C program, as is shown in Appendix C. The form of the argument list is
this: L = (atom prior-probability current-probability arc-expression ). The last
argument to DEFINE-NODE is an "arc expression," that describes the
incoming arcs and how their effects are to be combined.
(defmacro define-node (name prior-prob current-prob arcs)
'(progn
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(setf (get ',name 'prior-prob) ,prior-prob)
(setf (get ',name 'prior-odds) (odds ,prior-prob))
(setf (get ',name 'current-prob) ,current-prob)
(setf (get %,name 'current-odds) (odds ,current-prob))
(setf (get ',name 'arcs) ',arcs)))
The following functions will abbreviate the operations for accessing
property lists and accessing components of arc expressions.
(defun current-prob (n) (get n 'current-prob))
(defun prior-prob (n) (get n 'prior-prob))
(defun current-odds (n) (get n 'current-odds))
(defun prior-odds (n) (get n 'prior-odds))
(defun sufficiency (arc) (cadr arc))
(defun necessity (arc) (car (cddr arc)))
To combine the independent evidence effectively, it is necessary to know
the effects of the lambda values along each incoming arc, so that these can be
multiplied to get an overall lambda value. The next function determines an
effective lambda value.
(defun effective-arc-lambda (arc)
( (odds (update-prob h arc))
(prior-odds h)))
The function COMBINE-INDEP-LAMBDAS actually multiplies the





The following functions represent the conjunctive arc expression and the
disjunctive arc expression.
The function COMBINE-CONJUNCTIVE-LAMBDAS is returning the






The next function COMBINE-DISJUNCTIVE-LAMBDAS is returning the





The function UPDATE-NODE updates the current odds and probabilities
of all nodes, that is, the nodes on the list TEST except the mine-field node.
The sequence of nodes on the list is important: they must be topologically
sorted so that if there is an arc from A to B in the network, then either A
precedes B in the list, or A does not appear in the list.
(defun update-nodes (nodes)
(cond ((null nodes) nil)
(t (update-node (car nodes))
(update-nodes (cdr nodes)))))
The function EVAL-ARC-EXP evaluates an arc expression, finding an
effective odds updating factor that takes the effects of all the arcs in the
expression into account.
(defun eval-arc-exp (arc-exp)
(cond ((eq (car arc-exp) 'arc)
(effective-arc-lambda (cdr arc-exp)))
((eq (car arc-exp) 'indep)
(combine-indep-lambdas arc-exp))
((eq (car arc-exp) 'and)
(combine-conjunctive-lambdas arc-exp))
((eq (car arc-exp) 'or)
(combine-disjunctive-lambdas arc-exp))
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(t (print '(illegal arc expression)) (print arc-exp))))
The following function causes one node's values to be updated and shows
one node's current probability.
(defun update-node (h)
(setf (get h 'current-odds)
(* (prior-odds h)
(eval-arc-exp (get h 'arcs))))
(setf (get h 'current-prob) (prob (current-odds h)))
(format t "-%current probability of node -a is -s.-%"
h (current-prob h)))





C THE SIMULATION RESULTS
We now explain the simulation steps shown in Figure 4-2. A C program
mcm.c takes expert's imputs for constructing inference network: nodes name,
prior-probability and current-probability for each node, arc expression
including the atoms name and the necessary conditions P(E I H) and P(E I -H)
for computing sufficiency and necessity. Appendix B lists a sample usage
session of mcm.c while Appendix C lists the corresponding output. This
output from mcm.c would be the data segment, mcmdata.c , for the LISP
inference network.
For simulation, we load the inference network mcm.1 into the LISP
interpreter. A detailed simulation run is in Appendix D. We will
concentrate on the current probability of each node at the last line of each
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block. For example, in the simulation results, current probability of node
country-2 is as follows:
inhibitive probability updating for node country-2 along arc:
(mine-field 850.0 0.1502) with prior odds 0.0101010101010101.
prior and current probs of evident are 0.9 and 0.5.
Current probability of node country-2 is 0.006228832619601373.






SIMULATION (analyze) MINE WARFARE
RESULTS MEXPEEXPERT
Figure 4-2 The Procedure to Simulate the Programs
Table 4-1 summarizes the simulation results from Appendix D.
Analyzing the results and investigating the degree of confidence gives the
possible value for deploying the MCM forces.
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TABLE 4-1 SUMMARY OF THE SIMULATION RESULTS














In Table 4-1, the current probabilities of each node taken from Appendix
D are sorted in reverse order of the inference network levels. Combined with
Figure 4-1, comparison of the current probabilities of the nodes at the same
level, we have the following conclusion.
For this mine warfare scenarios, based on the analysis, we have a
confidence degree of 0.6568 to suggest that the commander deploy MCM
forces. The MCM forces may confront the threat of contact mine, or even the
threat of induced mine. Owing to the assumption of this task, the enemy
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may possibly, first, lay mines in the traffic lane of our fleet; secondly, in the
coast; and finally at a nearest land point that is an aid to navigation. The
enemy will probably use in descending order warships, civilian ships and
finally airplanes to lay mines. Country-1 may consider using submarines to
lay mines, because it is safer. The countries that might lay mines are country-
1, country-3, and country-2, in that order. However, in order to defend
herself, country-2's probability of laying mines increases. If there are mines in
the traffic lane and neither country-1 nor country-3 laid the mines, then
either country-2 laid them or they are residual mines from the past.
Therefore, to avoid being hit by mines, our fleets are strictly prohibited from
entering the waters until they are cleaned up by our MCM forces.
D. COMMENTS ON THE CERTAINTY FACTOR
As mentioned in Chapter II, the CF can be computed by the definitions of
Bayes' rule, MB, MD, and CF after we input the necessary probabilities. Table
4-2 sort the results of the CF for the relationship between H and E in Figure 4-
1.
TABLE 4-2 SUMMARY OF THE CERTAINTY FACTOR
Hypotheses Evidences Logic Condition Certainty Factors
country-1 mine-field independent -0.9693
country-2 mine-field independent 0.8946
country-3 mine-field independent -0.2958
submarine country-1 independent 0.7297
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civilian-ship country-1 independent -0.9650
country-2 independent 0.9980
country-3 independent 0.7059
aircraft country-1 independent -0.9764
country-2 independent -0.4444
country-3 independent -0.9979
warship country-1 independent 0.9301
country-2 independent 0.9980
country-3 independent -0.9540
nearest-point- submarine independent -0.9964
land aircraft independent -0.6667
nearest-point- civilian-ship


























force OR disjunctive 1.0
induced-mine
The notation CF[H,E] = X is used to represent the CF for the hypothesis H
based upon evidence E. For example, the last hypothesis and evidences in
Table 4-2 are expressed:
H = To deploy the MCM force,
El = The mine is the contact mine,
E2 = The mine is the induced mine.
Thus CF[H,E1VE2] = 1.0, this sample hypothesis above may be qualified as
follows:
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CF[H,EIVE2] = 1.0 There is definite (1.0) that to deploy the MCM
force.
The rest of the CF[H,E] value is listed in Appendix E.
From the above discussion, we conclude that Tanimoto's method [Ref. 5]
is consistent with MYCIN's method [Ref. 3]: both methods resolve the
inconsistency by the piecewise linear equations for updating the probabilities
instead of using a linear equation. In this chapter, we showed that MYCIN
and Tanimoto's method are different: Tanimoto computes the current
probability for each node and MYCIN compute the value of CF for each node.
For example, Table 4-1 has a confidence degree of 0.6568 to suggest that the
commander deploy MCM forces by the current probability of the deploy-
MCM-force node. From the Table 4-2, CF[H,EIVE2] = 1.0 means that it is
definite (1.0) to deploy the MCM force based upon the disjunctive evidence:
mines are contact mines (El) OR the mines are induced mines (E2). This CF
value (1.0) enhances the determination obtained by Tanimoto's method
(original value of 0.6568) of the commander to deploy the MCM forces. In
other words, CF and Tanimoto's methods could be treated as complementary.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis focuses on use of the probabilistic inference networks in an
expert system to make decision regarding mine countermeasures.
Implemented in LISP and C, this intelligent mine warfare expert system is
capable of assisting the commander in making efficient and accurate decisions
in mine warfare.
A. SUMMARY
Chapter I described the use of probabilistic inference networks to solve
MCM deployment problems and the objectives of building such a network
system. Chapter II discussed the required backgrounds for the thesis,
including mine warfare, expert systems, and FL. Description of the
mathematical model and the certainty factors for the thesis was accomplished
in Chapter III. In Chapter IV, the mathematical model was translated into
LISP and the CF values were computed; a code for LISP was created by a C
program that takes parameters from the user. Chapter IV showed the
simulation results. A commander can analyze the simulation results so that
he can make a decision whether to deploy MCMs forces.
B. FUTURE WORK
Many researchers have shown that the tactical knowledge, reasoning, and
decision-making process during war time can be modelled by condition-
action rules and associated expert systems. This thesis uses probabilistic
inference networks to investigate MCM deployment. To develop a
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reasonable mathematical model and to obtain accurate simulation results for
mine warfare in the future, the following efforts necessitate further studies:
- To gather a better or complete mine warfare chronicle for better
evaluation of X and .'.
- To develop the fuzzy tools such as: fuzzy processor, micro-computer
code, and to use fuzzy logic to manage mine warfare.
- To use a LISP machine that can help us to execute LISP program
efficiently.
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APPENDIX A. C PROGRAM
/,
The purpose of this program, mcm.c, is for the user to create
a data file named mcm.l. The user inputs the parameters
1. The number of levels,
2. The number of nodes in each level,
3. The current node name,
4. The prior-probability and current-probability
for each node, and
.5. The interrelationship of atoms wihtin node such as
(1). The number of atoms,
2). The atoms' name for each courrent node,
3). The probability for calculating SUFFICIENCY
and NECESSITY.
The probabilistic inference network should be obtained from an expert.










#define IsDigit(x) ((060 <= x) && (x <= 071))
#define FALSE 0
char invite[] = "Enter probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
char inviteatoms(] = "Enter the atoms name :\n",




. ist, 2n " 3,rd', '4th ,"5th", "6th"
"7th". "8th", "9th", "loth"};
int NofArc. NofNode. NsingleArc, NconjArc;
flolt ls.ln:




FILE *fp; /* To create a file to store the data of th node. *
int level, node-inievel, k,o,l,m;
:int NofLevel;
char lit(5j,litl[51,lit2 13];
/* liqj is eith-r null or indep.
liti []: yes, no, 0.
lit2 [J: and, or, 0. *
char fileb ase [fnameilenj, Nofnode[41, Nsinglearc[4], Nconj arc[4];
float prior-prob, current-prob;
strcpy( defuntest,"(defun test() (update-nodes'()
strcpy( filebase. ariv[ij); /* first argument is the file name
strcat (filebase,,".l); /* To create a file named fn.I. ~
fp = fopen (filebase,"w"); /* Open and write the file, we create it.
NofLevel = atoi(argv[2J); /* 2nd argument is the number of levels.
for level= 1 level < =Nof~evel; level++)
11t i( e-e 1;printf ("\nEnter the number of nodes in %s level :\n"
scanf ("Ws". Nofnode);
wvhile (!IsDigit(iNofnode[0j)) {/* Need numeric in here. *
printf ("Input Error!!\n");
printf ("nter the number of nodes in %s level : \n", nth [levelJ1);
scanf ( '%s",.Nof node);
Nol'Node ==atoi(Nofnode);
f'or (node-i nievel= 1; nodein-jevel <= NoflNode; nodel nievel ++)
printf ("Enter the current node name :\n");
scanf ( '%s".node);
whilfle (IsDigit(node[OJ) /* 'Need char in here. *
printfC'Input Eror!!\nEnter the current node name :n)
scanf ("%7s", node):
58
printf ("Enter the prior-prob and current- prob: \n")
scanf '(%f %-f".&prior-prob.&current-prob);
f printf (f p,"(define- node %s %.4f %.4fY
node, prior.p rob, current..prob);
if (level == 1) fprintf (fp, "())\n');
else {
new line:
printf ("Do vou have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)\n");
while(IsDigit(Iitl[O])){
printf(ofInput Error!!\n");
(yes/no)n"); printf("Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch
scanf ("%s",litl);
if (!strcmp(litl."no")) {
/no AND)/ OR arcs, yes I have indep arcs
IsNumeric () *Need numeric in here. *
fprintf (fp,' (indep\n");
for (k=1: k<=NofArc: k++){
Ii kelihoodo;
.atai~lsln);fprintf (fp,s" (arc: %s %.4f %.4f)\n'
if (k == NofArc){
fprintf( fp,')")
fprintf( fp," n)
}/* end for k<= NofArc ~}/* end if liti = 'no' */
else fpitf(p 
" (indep \n"):
printf ("Enter numnber of arcs except for 'and' or 'or' A\n");
scanf ('%s",Nsinglearc);
while (!IsDigit(Nsinglearc[OJ)) f /* Need numeric
in here */
printf( 'Input Error!!\n");
printf( "Enter number of arcs except for 'and'
(W An");scanf (%s " ,Nsinglearc);
NsingleArc = atoi(INsinglearc);
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for (o=1: o<=NsingleArc; o++){
likelihoodo;
.ato~ts.n);fprintf (fp, " (arc: %s %.4f %.4f)\n"
printf ("Enter the number of 'and' or 'or' :\n");
scanf ('%s".Nconj arc);
while (!IsD igit(Nconj arc [0])) { /* Need numeric in
here. */
printf ('Input Error!!\nEnter the number of
and'or ' r' A ");scanf ("% s" N conj arc);
NconjArc = atoi(Nconjarc);
for (1=1; 1<=NconjAr-c: 1+)
printf ("Enter 'and' or 'or':n)
scanf ( .,%s'lit2);
while (IsDigit(lit2[O1)) { /* Need char in here
printf("Input Error!!\nEnter 'and' or 'orl
scanf ("%s'.Iit);
IsNumeric (); /* Need numeric in here. *
fprintf (fp," (%7s\n.lit2);
for (m=l. m<=NofArc; m++){
likelihoodo;
fprintf (fp," (arc: %s %l'.4f %.4f)\n".atomn.
if (m ===NofArc)
fprintf (fp, " )n)
if (I == INCon~c
fprintf (fp , ')n'
} *end for l<==NconjArc *}/* end the nearest else */
/* end the farthest else *
new line:
if (level ,=1)
stircat(defuntest, node); /* To collect node.
If level isn't equal to 1. */
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strcat(defuntest, ~
I /* end nodeinjevel *
} ~end level *
fprintf (fp,'%s \n ',defuntest);
fclose(fp);
printf ("GoodBye");
S/* end main */
11 kdihood() /* This subroutine is calculating SUFFICIENCY and








scanf ( %f %7f",&pl.&p2);,
/* p1 prob(E/H) and p2 = prob(E/-H) *
I--= pi./p2:,
In (1-pl)/(1-p2);








APPENDIX B. THE C PROGRAM EXECUTION
Enter the number of nodes in 1st level1
Enter the current node name
mine-field
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.9 0.5
Enter the number of nodes in 2nd level
3
Enter the current node name:
country-1
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.7 0.001
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
10
Enter the number of arcs
I
Enter the atoms name:
mine-field
Plcase estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.01 0.8
Enter the current node name
country-2
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.01 0.85
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
11O
Enter the number of arcs
I
Enter the atoms name
mine-field
!:nse estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
.5 0.001
KIiter the current node name
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.3 0.01
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
[io
ILnter the number of arcs
Enter the atoms name
nime-field
Pl,-,ie estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.5 0.8
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lter the number of nodes in 3rd level
-1
FI-er the current node name
.-iu ian ne
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.3 0.01
)o you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
10
Enter the number of arcs
1
Enter the atoms name
country-1
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.01 0.001
Enter the current node name
civilian-ship
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.6 0.85
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
no
Enter the number of arcs :
3
Enter the atoms name
country-i
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.01 0.
Enter the atoms name
country-2
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.85 0.001
Enter the atoms name
countrv-3
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.5 0.1
Et er the current node name
aircraft
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.4 0.1
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
Enter the number of arcs
3
Enter the atoms name
Country- 1
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.01 0.7
Enter the atoms name
woI try*%-2
l~..,e c'stimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.: 0.7
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Enter the atoms name
cotintry-3
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.001 0.8
Enter the current node name
warship
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.7 0.85
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
no
Enter the number of arcs
3
Enter the atoms name:
country-1
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.20.01
Enter the atoms name
country-2
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.7 0.001
Enter the atoms name
country-3
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.01 0.7
Enter the number of nodes in 4th level
3
Enter the current node name
nearest-point-land
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.6 0.01
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
ves
Enter number of arcs except for 'and' or 'or'
Enter the atoms name
sitbmarine
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.001 0.7
Enter the atoms name
aircraft
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.1 0.6
Enter the number of 'and' or 'or'
1
Enter 'and' or 'or'
of*
Enter the number of arcs
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Enter the atoms name
civilian-ship
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.70.3
Enter the atoms name
warship
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.8 0.1
Enter the current node name
traffic-lane
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.7 0.9
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
Enter number of arcs except for 'and' or 'or'
0
Enter the number of 'and' or 'or'
1
Enter *and' or "or":
Enter the number of arcs
4
Enter the atoms name
.Ijbmarine
[lease estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.5 0.01
Enter the atoms name:
-ivilian-ship
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.8 0.1
Enter the atoms name
:ir-craft
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.5 0.1
.1nter the atoms name
wa1rship
'Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
1. 0.001
Enter the current node name
toastL
.nter the prior-prob and current-prob:
Q.7 0.4
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
Ves
Enter number of arcs except for 'and' or 'or'
Enter the atoms name
su bmarine
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.4 0.1
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Inter the atoms name:
aircraft
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.3 0.7
Enter the number of 'and' or 'or'
1
Enter "and' or 'or'
0*
Enter the number of arcs
2
Enter the atoms name:
civilian-ship
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.85 0.1
Eter the atoms name
war shi p
Plca.se estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.85 0.01
Enter the number of nodes in 5th level2
Enter the current node name
contact-mine
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.85 0.99
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
yes
Enter number of arcs except for 'and' or 'or'
1
Enter the atoms name:
traffic-lane
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.85 0.01
Eater the number of 'and' or 'or'
1
Enter 'and' or ?or'
o1
Enter the number of arcs
Enter the atoms name
nearest- point-land
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.8 0.1
Enter the atoms name:
coast
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.85 0.1
Enter the current node name
induced-mine
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Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.6 0.7
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
yes
Enter number of arcs except for 'and' or 'or'
1
Enter the atoms name:
traffic-lane
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.8 0.1
Enter the number of 'and' or 'or'
1
Enter 'and' or 'or':
or
Enter the number of arcs
Enter the atoms name
nearest-point-land
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.01 0.7
Enter the atoms name:
C C) as t
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.7 0.1
Enter the number of nodes in 6th level
1
Enter the current node name
dep loy-MCM-force
Enter the prior-prob and current-prob:
0.5 0.5
Do you have 'and' or 'or' branch :(yes/no)
yes
Eiter number of arcs except for 'and' or 'or'
0
Enter the number of 'and' or 'or'
1
Enter 'and' or 'or'
Enter the number of arcs
2
Enter the atoms name
contact-mine
Please estimate the probability for calculating sufficiency and necessity
0.9 0.00001
Enter the atoms name
induced-mine




APPENDIX C. DATA SEGMENT FOR LISP
This data file, mcmdata.1, is created by the user.
Each node is given by an expert. A complete node
looks like:
* (define-nede node-name prior-probability
: current- probability arc-expression)
The arc-expression consists of four cases:
S),ep
: (arc: atom-name sufficiency necessity)
* (3). (indep
* (arc: atom-name sufficiency necessity)
* ('or' or 'and'
: (arc: atom-name sufficiency necessity)
" ).. .
(4). (indep
: ('or' or 'and'
(arc: atom-name sufficiency necessity)
* ).
As we execute the main program in LISP, thesis.l,
will call this data file to infer the probabilistic
inference network.
(define-node mine-field 0.9000 0.5000 0)
(define-node country-1 0.7000 0.0010
(indep
(arc: mine-field 0.0125 4,9500)
)
(define-node country-2 0.0100 0.8500
(indep
(arc: mine-field 850.0000 0.1502))
)
(define-node country-3 0.3000 0.0100
(indep
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(arc: mine-field 0.6250 2.5000)
(cleine-node submarine 0.3000 0.0100
(indep
(arc: country-i 10.0000 0.9910)
(define- node civilian-ship 0.6000 0.8500
(indep
Sarc: country-i 0.0143 3.3000)
arc: country-2 850.0000 0.1502)
arc: country-3 5.0000 0.55-56)
(define-node aircraft 0.4000 0.1000
(indep
(arc: country-i 0.0143 :3.3000)
(airc: countrv -2 0.42S6 2.3333)
(arc: country-3 0.0013 4.9950)
(define-node warship 0.7000 0.8500
(indep
Sarc: country-I 20.0000 0.8081)
arc: countrv-2 699.9999 0.3003)
arc: country-3 0.0143 3.3000)
(delfine-node nearest-point- land 0.6000 0.0100
(indep
(arc: submarine 0.0014 3.3300)(arc: aircraft 0.1667 2.2500)
(Or
(arc: civilian-ship 2.3333 0.4286)
(arc: warship 8.0000 0.2222)
(define-node traffic-lane 0.7000 0.9000
(in dep
(or,
(arc: submarine .50.0000 0.5051)
(arc: civilian-ship 8.0000 0.2222)
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(arc: aircraft 5.0000 0.5556)
arc: warship 800.0000 0.2002)
))
(define-node coast 0.7000 0.4000
(indep
arc: submarine 4.0000 0.6667)
arc: aircraft 0.4286 2.3333)
or
(arc: civilian-ship 8.5000 0.1667)
arc: warship 85.0000 0.1515)))
(define-node contact-mine 0.8500 0.9900
(indep
arc: traffic-lane 85.0000 0.1515)
or
(arc: nearest-point-land 8.0000 0.2222)
(arc: coast 8.5000 0.1667)))
)
(define-node induced-mine 0.6000 0.7000
(indep
arc: traffic-lane 8.0000 0.2222)
(or
(arc: nearest-point-land 0.0143 3.3000)
(arc: coast 7.0000 0.3333))
)
(define-node deploy-NICM-force 0.5000 0.5000
(indep
(01"
arc: contact-mine 90000.0000 0.1000)
(arc: induced-mine 75000.0000 0.2500)))
(defun test() (update-nodes '( country-i country-2 country-3
submarine civilian-ship aircraft warship nearest-point-land
traffic-lane coast contact-mine induced-mine deploy-.IC.J-force )))
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NAPPENDIX D. SIMULATION RESULTS
inhibitive probability updating for node country-1 along arc:
(mine-field 0.0125 4.95) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.9 and 0.5.
Current probability of node country-1 is 0.7979194333776007.
inhibitive probability updating for node country-2 along arc:
(mine-field 850.0 0.1502) with prior odds 0.0101010101010101.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.9 and 0.5.
Current probability of node country-2 is 0.006228832619601373.
inhibitive probability updating for node country-3 along arc:
(mine-field 0.625 2.5) with prior odds 0.4285714285714286.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.9 and 0.5.
Current probability of node country-3 is 0.396551724137931.
suipportive probability updating for node submarine along arc:
country-1 10.0 0.991) with prior odds 0.4285714285714286.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.7979194333776007.
Citrrent probability of node submarine is 0.466727683859158.
suipportive probability updating for node civilian-ship along arc:
(country-1 0.0143 3.3) with prior odds 1.5.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.7979194333776007.
inhibitive probability updating for node civilian-ship along arc:
(country-2 850.0 0.1502) with prior odds 1.5.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.01 and 0.006228832619601373.
'Z,,pportive probability updating for node civilian-ship along arc:
(country-3 5.0 0.5556) with prior odds 1.5.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.3 and 0.396551724137931.
Current probability of node civilian-ship is 0.303937851020989.
si.ipportive probability updating for node aircraft along arc:
(cotintry-1 0.0143 3.3) with prior odds 0.6666666666666667.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.7979194333776007.
ithibitive probability updating for node aircraft along arc:
(country-2 0.4286 2.3333) with prior odds 0.6666666666666667.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.01 and 0.006228832619601373.
-,rpportive probability updating for node aircraft along arc:
(courntry-3 0.0013 4.995) with prior odds 0.6666666666666667.
'rior and current probs of evident are 0.3 and 0.396551724137931.
(,irren. probability of node aircraft is 0.2805644212476534.
-,,pportive probability updating for node warship along arc:
ii-,)intry-1 20.0 0.8081) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
I'rior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.7979194333776007.
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ithibitive probability updating for node warship along arc:
(ci.ntry-2 699.9999 0.3003) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.01 and 0.006228832619601373.
,lpportive probability updating for node warship along arc:
(comitry-3 0.0143 3.3) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.3 and 0.396551724137931.
Current probability of node warship is 0.6094573045137574.
,Ipportive probability updating for node nearest-point-land along arc:
(.-ibmarine 0.0014 3.33) with prior odds 1.5.
I'rior mid c'remt probs of evident are 0.3 and 0.466727683859158.
inhibitive probability updating for node nearest-point-land along arc:
(aircraft 0.1667 2.25) with prior odds 1.5.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.4 and 0.2895644212476534.
inhibitive probability updating for node nearest-point-land along arc:
(civilian-ship 2.3333 0.4286) with prior odds 1.5.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.6 and 0.303937851020989.
inihibitive probability updating for node nearest-point-land along arc:
(w'ship 8.0 0.2222) with prior odds 1.5.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.6094573045137574.
Cmrrent probability of node nearest-point-land is 0.46160740726002.
, Ijpportive probability updating for node traffic-lane along arc:
(,tbmarine 50.0 0.5051) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.3 and 0.466727683859158.
inhibitive probability updating for node traffic-lane along arc:
(civilian-ship 8.0 0.2222) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.6 and 0.303937851020989.
inhibitive probability updating for node traffic-lane along arc:
(ircraft 5.0 0.5556) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.4 and 0.2895644212476534.
inhibitive probability updating for node traffic-lane along arc:
(waMrship 800.0 0.2002) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.6094573045137574.
Current probability of node traffic-lane is 0.76943050857591.
supportive probability updating for node coast along arc:
(submarine 4.0 0.6667) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.3 and 0.466727683859158.
inhibitive probability updating for node coast along arc:
(aircraft 0.4286 2.3333) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.4 and 0.2895644212476534.
inhibitive probability updating for node coast along arc:
(civilian-ship 8.5 0.1667) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.6 and 0.303937851020989.
inhibitive probability updating for node coast along arc:
(warship 85.0 0.1515) with prior odds 2.333333333333333.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.6094573045137574.
(,irrent probability of node coast is 0.73708420559377.
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N-, npportive probability updating for node contact-mine along arc:
(t raffic-lane 85.0 0.1515) with prior odds 5.666666666666667.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.76943050857591.
inhibitive probability updating for node contact-mine along arc:
i ie:.re-,t-point-land 8.0 0.2222) with prior odds 5.666666666666667.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.6 and 0.46160740726002.
-. pportive probability updating for node contact-mine along arc:
(coast 8.5 0.1667) with prior odds 5.666666666666667.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.73708420559377.
Current probability of node contact-mine is 0.8970485714594268.
supportive probability updating for node induced-mine along arc:
(traffic-lane 8.0 0.2222) with prior odds 1.5.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.76943050857591.
inhibitive probability updating for node induced-mine along arc:
(nearest-point-land 0.0143 3.3) with prior odds 1.5.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.6 and 0.46160740726002.
supportive probability updating for node induced-mine along arc:
(coast 7.0 0.3333) with prior odds 1.5.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.7 and 0.73708420559377.
iI I 'TL prWobabilityv of node induced-mine is 0.7228861921773642.
-Ipporkive probability updating for node deploy-MCM-force along arc:
(contact-mine 90000.0 0.1) with prior odds 1.0.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.85 and 0.8970485714594268.
supportlive probability updating for node deploy-MCM-force along arc:
(induced-mine 75000.0 0.25) with prior odds 1.0.
Prior and current probs of evident are 0.6 and 0.7228861921773642.
Ciurrent probability of node deploy-MCM-force is 0.6568250864907779.
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APPENDIX E. CERTAINTY FACTORS CONCLUSIONS
The following explanations are starting from top to bottom in Table 4-1.
H = The country-1 will lay the mines;
E = The mine-field is existence;
CF[H,E] = -0.%93 There is weakly suggestive evidence (0.9693) that
the country-1 will lay the mines.
H = The country-2 will lay the mines;
E = The mine-field is existence;
CF[H,E] = 0.8946 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.8946) that
the country-2 will lay the mines.
H = The country-3 will lay the mines;
E = The mine-field is existence;
CF[H,E] = -0.2958 There is not weakly suggestive evidence (0.2958)
that the country-3 will lay the mines.
H = The submarine will deliver the mines;
E = The country-1 will use it;
CF[H,E] = 0.7297 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.7297) that
the submarine will deliver the mines.
H = The civilian-ship will deliver the mines;
E = The country-1 will use it;
CF[H,E] = -0.9650 There is weakly suggestive evidence (0.9650) that
the civilian-ship will deliver the mines.
H = The civilian-ship will deliver the mines;
E = The country-2 will use it;
CF[H,E] = 0.9980 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.9980) that
the civilian-ship will deliver the mines.
H = The civilian-ship will deliver the mines;
E = The country-3 will use it;
CF[H,E] = 0.7059 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.7059) that
the civilian-ship will deliver the mines.
H = The aircraft will deliver the mines;
E = The country-1 will use it;
CF[H,E] = -0.9764 There is weakly suggestive evidence (0.9764) that
the aircraft will deliver the mines.
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H The aircraft will deliver the mines;
E = The country-2 will use it;
CF[H,E] = -0.4444 There is not weakly suggestive evidence (0.4444)
that the aircraft will deliver the mines.
H = The aircraft will deliver the mines;
E = The country-3 will use it;
CF[H,E] = -0.9979 : There is weakly suggestive evidence (0.9979) that
the aircraft will deliver the mines.
H = The warship will deliver the mines;
E = The country-1 will use it;
CF[H,E] = 0.9301 : There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.9301) that
the warship will deliver the mines.
H = The warship will deliver the mines;
E The country-2 will use it;
CF[H,E] = 0.9980 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.9980) that
the warship will deliver the mines.
H - The warship will deliver the mines;
E = The country-3 will use it;
CF[H,E] = -0.9540 There is weakly suggestive evidence (0.9540) that
the warship will deliver the mines.
H = The mines will lay at the nearest-point-land;
E = The submarine will do it;
CF[H,E] = -0.9964 There is weakly suggestive evidence (0.9964) that
the mines will lay at the nearest-point-land.
H = The mines will lay at the nearest-point-land;
E = The aircraft will do it;
CF[H,E] = -0.6667 There is weakly suggestive evidence (0.6667) that
the mines will lay at the nearest-point-land.
H = The mines will lay at the nearest-point-land;
El = The civilian-ship will do it; OR
E2 = The warship will do it;
CF[H,E1VE2] = 0.8077 : There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.8077) that
the mines will lay at the nearest-point-land.
H = The mines will lay at the traffic-lane;
El = The submarine will do it; OR
E2 = The civilian-ship will do it; OR
E3 = The warship will do it; OR
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E4 = The aircraft will do it;
CF[H,E] = 0.9982 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.9982) that
the mines will lay at the traffic-lane.
H = The mines will lay at the coast;
E = The submarine will do it;
CF[H,E] = 0.6774 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.6774) that
the mines will lay at the coast.
H = The mines will lay at the coast;
E = The aircraft will do it;
CF[H,E] = -0.2857 There is not weakly suggestive evidence (0.2857)
that the mines will lay at the coast.
H = The mines will lay at the coast;
El = The civilian-ship will do it; OR
E2 = The warship will do it;
CF[H,EIVE2] = 0.9833 : There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.9833) that
the mines will lay at the coast.
H = The contact-mine will be laid;
E = The mines will lay at the traffic-lane;
CF[H,E] = 0.9862 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.9862) that
the contact-mine will be laid.
H = The contact-mine will be laid;
El = The mines will lay at the nearest-point-land; OR
E2 = The mines will lay at the coast;
CF[H,E] = 0.8644 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.8644) that
the contact-mine will be laid.
H = The induced-mine will be laid;
E = The mines will lay at the traffic-lane;
CF[H,E] = 0.8077 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.8077) that
the induced-mine will be laid.
H = The induced-mine will be laid;
El = The mines will lay at the nearest-point-land; OR
E2 = The mines will lay at the coast;
CF[H,E] = 0.7825 There is strongly suggestive evidence (0.7825) that
the induced-mine will be laid.
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H - To deploy the MCM force;
El = The contact-mine will be laid; OR
E2 - The induced-mine will be laid;
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